The issue highlights the complexity of minority identification, which is manifest in the vastly different approaches law and legal measures need to follow when providing protection from victimization in hate crimes and discrimination on the one hand, and accommodating multicultural (or other) diversity-claims on the other. I will argue that although the legislative goal to design a precise set of requirements is common to both approaches, perception will be the crucial concept in the former, while choice and identification in the latter.
In what follows, I will first unfold the Murphy's paradox on free choice of identity. I will highlight the theoretical contradictions and practical malfunctions within the reading that recognizes the free choice of identity as a principle of international minority rights protection law. I will argue that the legally undefined (thus, practically unrestrained) right to minority identification may in practice actually lead to inherent inefficiencies in rights protection, in two distinct ways.
First, when it comes to protection from discrimination, or racially motivated hate crimes, hate speech, or even genocide, data protection, the subsidiary guarantee for free choice of identity in fact may become an obstacle for rights protection and may prevent authorities from prosecuting perpetrators who base their action on perceived ethno-racial identity. I will claim that external perception of ethno-national identity in certain situations consequently deems the right to choose identity illusory.
The second consequence of the, in my opinion, false understanding of free of choice identity as a legal right protected by international instruments concerns remedial measures, affirmative action and minority rights as ethno-cultural claims. If we were to accept the existence of such a legal right, the subsequent lack of requirements for both minority grouprecognition and membership opens the possibility for misusing these rights, enabling members of the majority to enjoy preferences they should not be eligible for, and excluding those whom these policies should be targeting. The paradox lies within the basic tenet of legal logic: if there is a right to free choice of identity allowing human beings to opt out from racial, ethnic or minority (minority) communities, the very right necessarily includes the freedom to opt in somewhere. I will argue that this is hardly something international law would set forth.
Continuing the line of substantial content-focused inquiry, I will turn to analyzing the habitually used definitions and conceptualizations for minority groups and membership criteria. My aim is to motivate two claims.
